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.  -·  \ 
I.  GENERAL 
.·1.  In  1985,  in  its. White  Paper _on  the· completion  of the  -Internal·· M~ket, the 
Comm!ssion announced its intention to  p~opose a Dir~ctive on the approximation of· 
Member States' regulations on .tclke<?ver bids.  -
OnJ9 'January  1989, the  Co~issi()n presented-to-the~ Council  a proposal  for  a 
Thirteenth  Council  Directive  on  company law,· concerning  takeover  and  other 
general .bids.1 . TI1e  Economic  and  Social  Commjttee deiivered  its  opinion on 27 
September 1989/  and the Etiropean Parliament delivered its favourable opinion on 
. 17 Janmiry 1990.3.  ·  ·  ·  · · 
On 10 September 1990, the Comffiissiori adopted an amended proposal, in order to 
. take into accoUnt these two opinions.  4  -
2.  Negothitions on this proposalin the Council Working·group were suspended in June  . · 
1991  due to serious 'opposition from certain Member States. The most' controversial 
issues vvere the. requirement for-a full mandatory bid as the only--means to protect 
$hority shareholders  in the: case of an  acquisition •  or a  change  of· control,  the 
'limitation of the powerS of the board of the target company during the bid and the 
need for legally bindmg provisions governing the procedure for takeovers especially 
in the absence of  measures to'remove the structural obstacles to takeovers 'in several. 
Member  States.  .._., 
3.  In its declaration to the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992 on the 
subject of  subsidiarity, the CoiDIIiission in.dicated itS intention to revise its proposal 
and  _reconfrrmed this at the European Council in Essen in December 1  ~94: 
.  - .  .  - . 
·After the Stimmit in Edinburgh~ the Commission initiated, in June 1993, a detailed 
consuitaticm wjth Member States in order t()  give .them the opportunity ·to  submit 
th~ir current views on the proposal and in general on the need for harmonisation in . 
the field of  takeovers.  ·  · 
4.  The present proposal for a II framework" Directive is; made in the liiht of  the results 
.. of the  above  'menti~ned consultation  with.  Member  States,  in  which . a  majority  · 
indicated their prefereO:ce  for  a  Directive which established ·  genernt  principles to  · 
govern takeovers, but which did not attempt a qetailed harmonisati<?il, as iil the text 
originally proposed.  •  . .  ' . 
.  1''·  .. 
·1 OJ No C64, 14.3.19S9,-p. 8; with explanatory memorandum, Suppl. 3/89- Bull: Ec: 
2  .  .  '  OJ No C 298, 27.11.1989, p.56 .. 
.  3QJNoC38,19.2.1990;p.41..  .  .  . 
.  4 oj  No C 240, 2l9.1990, p.7; with explanatory memorandum, COM(90) 416 final- SYN  186  .  .  '  .  .  .  .  .  . 
·  .. :·.  ·. 
'  '" .  ··~. ·~ .. · .. 
··  .. ( 5.  The  Commission's  original proposal  was  an  ambitious  text  put  forward  in the. 
late 'SOs during a period of  considerably increased intern~tional merger and takeover 
activity.' The period of relative .inactiviur which followed due to the recession had 
negative consequences for the willingness of Member States to be bound by such a 
detailed text. · 
However,  takeover activity  appears  to  be  once  again  qn the  increase  in  certain 
Member States, esp'ecially as the proposed Tenth company law Directive on cross-_ 
border mergers rema_tns  blocked. The conditions for takeovers remain very. uneven 
in the meantime in the Member States, both as regards the regulation of  this type of 
finandal operation and as regards its feasibility and frequency. 
6.  The Commission's aim in proposing the Directive was not to encourage takeovers as 
an end in themselves. Its standpoint has always been thatsuch operations may be 
. viewed  in  a  positive  light  in so  far  as  they  contribute  to  the  expansion  and 
.  reconstruction of Europeari  companies,  which  is  indispensable  in  order to  meet 
international-competition. The Commission's aim is to ensure that when a takeover 
occurs, it takes place in a context of legal security where all the interested parties 
will have prior knowledge of  the conditions under which they need to operate. 
·The Commission also considers that it is a legitimate concern for the Union (legal 
basis Art. 54 of  the Treaty) to ensure that within the internal. market shareholders of 
listed companies enjoy eqUivalent safeguards fu the caSe of a change of control and 
that a certain level of  transparency prevails during takeovers . Therefore, the aims of 
the  Directive  are  to  ensure  an  adequate  level  of protection  for  shareholders 
throughout the Union and  to provide foi minimum guidelines on the conduct of . 
takeover bids.  ·  · 
7.  The proposed Directive creates a framework consisting of certain principles. and a 
limited number of general requirements, which Member States will tJe: reqUired to 
implement  through  more  detailed  rules.  The  new approach  will  allow  Member 
States  to  deal  with  the  detailed  rule~ .for .  the  implementation  of the  Directive 
according to their national practices With  considerably more room for manoeuvre 
than-they would have had with the more detailed Directive originally proposed. 
·Thus, the Directive attempts to overcome many of  the difficulties caused in the past 
by the wide differences between Member States as far as the attitudes to regulating 
takeovers are concerned. In fact,  the framework Directive provides for a structure 
which permits the maintenance of existing natioruil differences provided that these 
differences  do  not  go  as  far  as  to  undermine  the  common  principles  and 
· requirements set out by the Directive at Community level.  ·  · c.~ .:8.:.  Th~  -new proposal·covers· most of  the·.field,pfthe:~1·990  'Proposal but-in:'a  less~detitiled 
w~y. There is-an obligation for Member States to designate a superv-isory -authority 
and  to' ensure  that  effect i!;  given  through  more-detailed  rules  to  the _general 
principles ~d  requirements set out in the Directive. Such requirementsfocu~  o~  the_ 
protection~-of minority -shareholders,  the_  necessary  degree  of in:fonrtation  and 
disclosure during the procedure; and the role that the board of the of:ferc;:e company 
should play dUring the· bid. 
" . 
9.  In ~ase of an acquisition or a change of  control- of a  'list~d company~ the proposal 
requires-~tluit specific national niles should be adopted-to guarantee that minority 
shareholders are protected. The mandatory bid is no longer treated as th~ orily means 
to protect minority shareholders as was the-case in the· previous proposal. That is ·14e 
most importantinn9vation in the present propo~al for a frame~ork:Directive. This  -
protection can be erisured either by a mandatory bid or by other means which should 
be-~uivalent..Member States are competenfto determine the notion ofcontrol iri 
terms Of voting  righ~. If _Member  States _provide  for the  maridatory  bid,  all  the _ 
requirements of  _the  Directiv~  _  should be respected.  If that is  not the case,  these-
requirements should ,apply to the ~ids which are launched on a voluntary basis and 
ahned at acquiring control of  the offeree company.  -
10. · The proposed Directive requires Member States to ensure a basic level of_ disclosure 
and information which will guarantee tran.Sparency during the takeover bid. It is left 
to Member States to determiJ:le -how stich transpare~cy will be ensured.: The process 
of inforining the  employees of the  offeree company is not subject to  a  specific 
provision, which-leaves Member States free'to deal with-this issue according to their 
usual prilctices.  -- ;  · 
11. ---The  _proposed  bifective  requii:es  .Member  States  to __ designate_ the  authority  or 
~:uthorities which will have the power to supervise the respect of  the takeover rules. 
New provisions have been introdu~ed inorder to allow the supervisory authority a 
'degree of discretion iii exercising its responsibilities. Moreover, the-" Directive does -
not exclude the possibility' of control  being exercised -by··a  self regulatory .body 
which will have the power to decide on complaints with regard to a takeover bid. 
The extent to  ~hich the Courts inay intervene -will  be a matter:for each Member 
State,- provided -that -there  is·_ at  least  a -right- to  bring -proceedings  to  __ claim - _ 
compensation; There is no requir~ment to suspend or interrupt the takeover proce~s 
_  if  a party takes the matter to Court. - -
.. -·  '  .  ~  .  .  .  '  .  . 
'  ·  ..  .  .  ~ ..  .  ..  . 
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_, II.  SUBSIDIARITY 
This proposal sets out to amend the 1990 proposal- for a 1¥rteenth Directive specifically 
in  order ·to  take  account  of the  principle  of subsidiarity  and  the  outcome  of the . 
Commission's consultations with the Member States. 
The previous proposal made very  detailed provision for 'ilie objectives to be pursued and 
the procedures to be followed.  . · 
The present pt<;>posal is for a framework Directive which would state the objectives to be 
.achieved while leaving the Member States a wide measUre of  discretion to determine how 
this is to be done. Shareholders are often dispersed through different Member States, and 
the Directive aims in particular to give th~m  a minimum level of  protection which would 
·be equivalent throughout the CommUnity,  as provided in ·Article 54(3)(g).  In order to 
achieve this  Member States have a  choice between ·the  mandatory  bid and  any  other 
means which will secure the same result but which may be more closely in line with their  .  . 
own domestic legal  traditions.  As stated earlier,  a  framework Directive  establishes  a 
structure  which allows  national  differences  to  be -maintained as  long as  they·  do  not 
undermine  the·  common · principles . and  objectives  that  the  Directive  defines ·  .  at 
Community level. 
The proposal  is  concerned  with takeover bids,  which are  complex transactions  with 
transnational implications. Any action taken by individual Member States will be limited . 
in its territorial effect, and cannot achieve the objectives pursued here.  · 
. ill. COMMENTARY ON THE ARTICLES 
Article 1 
The  Directive applies ·to  companies  governed by the  law -of a  Member State whose 
seclJrities are admitted to trading wholly or partially on one or more Stock Exchanges in 
the Community. The words "wholly or partially" are the only innovation compared with 
the  previous. text  and  indicate that  the  Directive applies  also  in cases where  only  a 
proportion of the offeree company's  secUrities  conferring voting nghts is  listed.  It is 
evident that, sipce the Directive lays down minimum requirements, the Membe.r States 
are free to apply the terms of  the Directive to companies whose securities are not listed 
· on a stock exchange.  ·  · 
.  I 
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'  ! ··  ··  Article 2 
Definitions 
This" Article defines "in  the same way as  in.theprevious text the-_mosf important terins .· 
used in the Directive.  .  ·  · 
· In- particular,  ~t is necessary' to .specify that the provisions of the Directive apply both to 
mandatory  and voluntafybids.' A bid.may be mandatory where it is: provided by Member 
.  States as a means to protect minority shar:eholders in CaSe of  a CQange of control. A bid 
may be voluntarY when it is hiunche.d -by a person without- b~ing  ·obliged to;_ in 'order to 
· acquire control of  a company.  · 
.  .  .  . 
-Article 3 
Protection of  minority shareholders 
.  . 
This article reflects the new  approach~of  the Directive; 
., .. 
The  rum  is to  ensure  that every time .  a person ·or entity·· acquires  control  Of  a  listed 
.. company ~  a resUlt of acquisition, minority slUueholders are protected. To that end, the 
·  Directive requires that nationaJ rules give proper safeguardsto the minority shareholders. 
Such safeguards can be ensured either by providing for a mandatory' bid, as was required 
by the previous version of  the Directive, or  by other. means. Member States whic~  do not 
'adopt the mandatory bid.as a  way to.protect
1the minority sharehold~ts must demonstrate .. 
that these other means really give minority shareholders a  p~oper  protection."  '  . 
Such protection c~  ~guaranteed  by other. means, as is the case in some Member.States. 
In  some  cases,  under  the  law  on  groups  of companies,  minority  ~hB:feholders  are . 
_protected  after the purchase of a major holding in the company. For instance, minority . 
shar.eholders .of a compariy  which becomes  dependent on another company, within  a: · 
·.  sontract based· group,  are_ entitled  to  recurrent  payments  or·.may  withdraw  from  the 
dependent company 6n payment of an indemnity. Furthermore, claims for damages by 
·the dependent company against members of  the. organs of  the controlling company may  -
also be made' by miilority shareholders of the.dependent company.  In addition; if the  · 
control: ch~ges~ in- the  context 'of a  de. facto  group,  the  controlling  company  must .  ·. ' 
compensate the dependent company for any detrimental measures taken against it. 
The new .approach is necessary in order to  acco~odat~ celtain -Member States. which  , 
·.were particularly. opposed to the obligation to launch a bid in the case o(  the acqUisition' 
of control, ·  as  a ineans ·of protecting the minority  shareholders.  These  Member States 
consider- that such protection  is  ensured  in.  theii'  0~  jurisqiction  by .  other  effective  .. 
means, such as those ·described at>ove. .  ·  ·  · 
,'·  ... 
.-The Directive itself does not attempt to define the percentage of  voting rights conferring 
control nor the method of  its calculation, as was the case in the previous text. Given the 
difficulties which  arose  during  the  negotiations  in relation to. the  previous text,  these 
· matters are to be defined by the Member State where the supervisory authoritY is situated 
according to article 4. 
Article 4 
Suproisozy authority 
,  Member  States  are  required  to  designate  a  supervisory .authority  or  authorities  to 
supervise all aspects of the bid and to ensure compliance by all the parties to the bid with· 
the rules made pursuant to this Directive. 
In the case where the registered office of the offeree company is not in the State where 
· the company is listed, the  competent authority would be that of the Member State on 
whose  regulated  market the  securities  of the  offeree  company  were  first  admitted  to 
trading and where they still are traded._  · 
In order to  secure  the flexible  application  of the 'Directive,  while  at  the  same  time 
· ensuring that flexibility does not go so far as to undermine its general principles, Member 
States may.grant .!o their supervisory authorities a power to waive certain national tules 
adopted in· accordance  with this  Directive.  Nevertheless, in doing· so  the  supervisory 
authority should always be guided by the generalprinciples hrid down in this Directive. 
Such flexibility may be  necessary in order to enable. t:Jle  supervisory authority to cope 
with a great variety of  circumstances which can arise in fast moving firuincial markets . 
. The paragraph 5 intends to solve the difficulties with regard to the avoidance of  litigation 
during a Takeover. bid.  Member States may  confer upon their supervisory authorities 
powers enabling them to  order any  measure which they deem necessary concerning a 
. takeover bid. ·In  addition,  proceedings  before these authorities may even be explicitly 
encouraged in order to avoid recourse to judicial action. Nevertheless, these proceedings 
· cannot exclude the right of  an injured party to have recourse to the Courts in order at least 
to claim compensation in case of  damage .  .  . 
ArticleS 
General principles 
This article  contairis  a  series  of general  principles  which  must  be  respected  by  the 
national rules  which  implement the  Directive.  The objectives of  the  principles· in the 
previous text are not affec~ed. 
6 
. 
' The first .principle' is that holde~S of  securities in the offeree company who are ln the SaiDt( 
· position  should .be  accorded  eqwil  treatment.  Second,  it  is  necessary· to  ensure  that . 
persons  to  whom ·the .bid  is. addressed  have  sufficient  time· arid  all  the  necessary  · 
.. information to take a decision qn the·bid. The third is designed to ensurethat·the board of . 
the offeree company acts in  the interests of  the .company  t~en  aS a whole; having regard  .. 
in particular to the interests· of  i~s shareholdt(rs.  "~lie objective of  the fourth principle is to 
preventthe cr:eation of  false marketS in the securities of  companies concerned by the bid.-
Finally,  the  purpose-of the  fifth  principle· is 'to ensirre  that  th~ affairs ~of the  offeret(  · 
company_ are not·i~~ded  .for an tinrea5onable time.  ·  ·  ·.  .  -.  ' 
Article 6 (information)  ......... 
l  .  '  .  .  ...  - ' 
. National rules must ensure that the addressees ()fa bid dispose of sufficient information ·  . 
.  about the terms:ofthe bid. Moreover, as soon as the offeror decides to make the bid he 
~uSt announcehis-intentioh tothe.supervisory ~uthority and to fue board of the offeree-
' company.  ~~:  .  -
The offeror must also be  ~equired by nati.onal rules to prepare and make public in. good  ··. · 
time' an offer document contaiiling all the necessary iriformation to enable the addresses 
of  the bid to reach a properly informed decision, The. offer ciocunient must- be forWarded.-
to  the  supervisory authority before  itS. publication. All parties to  the  bid should also 
p~ovide the supervisory authprity, at its request." with all the· necessary furormatiop for the 
dischar~e ofitS d\lties.  - .  ·  .  ·  - .  -
Article 7 (DisclosUre) 
Member States mtist  ensure  that ·  infomiati~n -capable  of having  an influence  o~ the 
wket in the securities concerned shoUld be maiie' public ·in such a  way as to redu.ce 'the -
. possibility ofthe creatimi offal_s.e markets and insiderdealing.  .  '  - . 
"the Directive does not ~numerate-the forms ~f  d.isclos'ure a5 was the case in  the previous . 
. text. it.Ieaves a wide aiscretionary power- to Member ·states to decide the requisite forms 
·of disclpsure, provided that all  the  necessary' ·infomi:ation  is  both clear. and promptly 
· avai,lable to the addressees of  the. bid;  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
··ArtiCle 8 (Obligation~  o(~e  bo~d·ofthe  -offeree company) 
,. 
·The Article requires Member· States to. ensU.re .that· the board of the offeree comp~y  will  ·. 
·refrain from adopting  ~defensive measure~  ~hich.  may result iri the :f:r4Stration of  the offer 
without the_authorisati.on ofth~ general  meeting of  the shaiel)olders:  ·  ·  · 
~  .  •  •  I  ' 
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···:-In the context of  a change of  contr~l of a company it is import;mt to ensure that the fate 
of  the offeree company will be decided by its shareholders. The Directive does not define 
the  mea8ures  which  can  frustrate  for ·a  bid.  In  general,  such  measures  may  be. all 
operations which are not carried out in the-normal course of the company's business or 
not in conformity with normal market practices. The authorisation of  the general meeting 
' should. be given explicitly for the purposes of  a.bid~  ·  · 
This bah should take effect from the tinie that the offeror informs the board of  the offeree 
company that he intends to make a bid until the result of  the bid is mad~  public according 
to national rules. 
The board of  the offeree company must also be required by national rules to give its view  .. 
of  the bid in a report setting out the: arguments .for and a  girl~  acceptance of  the. offer. · 
Article 9 
Rules applicable for tqe conduct of  bids 
· ·This Article lists a number of-matterS which Member States' rules must cover, without .. 
going into any detail. This approach leaves to Member States a substantial discretionary 
power as regards the content of  these rules. Such rules should state a) the circumstances 
under which a bid. can be withdrawn, once it is made public, b) the procedure that the 
offeror should respect if  he wants to revise the terms of his bid, c) the way competing 
bids should be treated and d)-the moment, when and the.way in which the parties should. 
be informed of  the outcome ofthe'bid  .. 
Member States should ensure that the general principles, and especially the one which 
states that the offeree company should· not be hindered in the conduct of its affairs for -
. longer than  is  reasonable,  are  respected  by .  the national  rules made pursuant to  this  · 
Article. 
Since the general principles which ought to govern the national ruies which de8I with the. 
conduct of  takeover bids are harmonised by this Directiv~, the Directive does not attempt 
to harmOnise the detailed procedures which implement those principles. 
Article tO 
Mandatory .hid 
The mandatory bid' is no longer th..e  only means to protect minority shareholders under 
this  Directive.  Nevertheless,  where  Member States  do  provide  for  a  mandatory  bid, 
Article 10 applies. Pursuant to this Article, Member States. are allowed to provide for 
either a fulfor a partial-mandatory bid~  · 
s: 
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According  to ·the. ·rule applicable  to  the ·  ftdl ,mandatory  bid, .  the  person who acquires 
control_ of a  listed  company  should· be  oblig~d ·tti  launch·~ takeover  bid .Jor all  the- ·_ 
COrUpaJ1iS remaining'  shares. 1;be objectiv~  .of this nile is to give a right of exit .from  the~ 
companyto all the remaining shareholderS\vho do not welcome the chang~.  of  c_onftoL  . 
•  \  •  ~  •  •  '  •  •  '  I  .,  2 
·' Tqe' full  mandatory ,bid was  th~ exclusive rule in. the previous text to  guarantee that all 
.  shareholders  are ·treated equally to -those  shareholders  who 'sold the controlling  ·stake~  _· 
There wer~ serious objeetibnsto the imposition ofthe·full mandatory bid on allMember 
States~  .. Therequireinent for a full  mandatory bid was criticised as  a. bmden onbt~sirtess 
which would undermine IJ?afk~tmechanisms and be liable to upsetthe flllancial marketS. 
-·.The present text 'allows for p-artial bids provided that they fulfil the objective· of  the equal 
treatment 'of shareholders and they are not purely 'speculative;  . ..  .  . - '  '' 
•  ....  •  •  '  ',  I  •  •  •  ~ 
Acco~ding:to the rule  applicabl~ to  th~ partial mandatory bid, 'the person who acquires' .. _ 
control of a listed company should be  obltg~,  to rrrake' a bid for a substa,ritial 'percentage ' ,·. 
bf the remaining shares; Stich a percentage should be·lpgh enough to meet the obj~ctive 
of the  protection .of minorities: ·The 'principle. qf eqwil  treatment in  cases  of partial 
Iilandatory'bids·ismet by the requir,ementfot-.the pro rata purchase oftheholdi.Ugs of  the 
reni~g  shareholders.  ·  -- ·  ·  ·  - · 
'  •  fu both cases;  full:~r partial, the bid shall  be addressed to all shareholders, who ~~t  be ' 
·. given  .the  opportunity  to  sell ' their  shares  at  a  price  which  meets  the .  objective ' of 
.. protecting their inter~sts; ·  · - .- · ··  - ·  · . . 
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/.: PROPO~AL  F:OR A"l3TH EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUN(:IL 
DIRECTIVE ON COMPANY LAW CONCERNING. 
TAKEOVER BIDS 
THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  COUNCIL.  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
. ·'UNION,· 
Having  regard to the Treaty  establishing the  Europ~ru{ Cpmmunity,· and  in particular.··-
Article 54  ther~of; 
· Ha~ing  regard to the proposal from the Commission; 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic. and Social Committee; 
Whereas it is necessary to coordinate certain safeguards which Member_ States require of  ·· 
companies and firms  wi¢.in the  meaning of the  second paragraph of Article 58  of the  .. 
·Treaty  for the protection of members  and  :others,  in  order  to .make ·such  safegtiarcis . 
equivalent throughout the Coiruminity; 
Whereas itis necessary to protect-theinterests of  shareholders of  companies governed by. 
the  law ofa Member State when these companies are subject to  a takeover bid or to a 
change Of control and their securities are admitted to trading on a regulated .market within· 
the scope ofthisD.irective;  .  .  J  •  • 
.  ' 
Whereas· only action at Community level can ensure an adequate level of protection for 
shareholders throughout the Union and provide for minimum guidelines for the .conduCt 
·of take~ver.bids; whereas Member States acting independently are not able to establish 
the same level of  protection especially In the case of  cross-border take-:overs or purchases 
of  control;  .  .  · 
Whereas  the  a~~ption.  of a pirective is  the  appropriate  procedure  for  laying  d~wn- a 
framework  consisting  of certain  common  principles  and  a limited number  of general 
requirements which Member States will be required to implement through more detailed 
rules according to their natibnal systems arid their cultural contexts;  /  · 
.; 
•••  1 r 
/"  _,t 
. .:..· 
·Whereas 'Memb~r States ~houldtake the necessary steps  in- order to  protect  shar~,holders . · 
having  minority  holdings .after the  purchase  of the.  cont~ol-of their company;  whereas 
such a protection can be ensured eit~er by. obliging the person who acquired _tl)e  contr~l 
of a· company to make a bid to all  shareholders fQr  all  or for  a substantial  part of their-
-h'oldings  or  by  providing  for  othe~ means. which  attain. the .  objective  of ;:tt  least  an 
equivalent level ofprotection  of  mino~ity  ~hareholders; .  .  . 
;Whereas each Member State should designat¢'  an authority or authorities to superviseall 
-aspects of the bid and to ensure that parties tt) takeover bids comply with the rules made 
pursuant to  this_ Directive;  whereas  the· different' authorities  must  cooperate, with  one 
~other:  - - ·. 
' 
Whereas it is desirable to  e~courage the .voluntary controL exercised by self regulatory 
bodies -in order to 'avoid recourse to administrative orjudicial action;  .  .  . 
-....  •  •  •  j 
Whereas to  reduce the scOpe  for  insider dealing  offeror~ should  b~ rcquired.to'announce' 
their  intention of ·launching  a  bid  as  soon. as  possible  and  to  inform· the. supervisory 
~uthority and the offeree company's board ·of the bid before they are  mad~  public; 
Wherecisthe addressees of a t~~over  bid should be properly informed of  the terms ofthe 
bid by means of  an offer document;  '  ·  ·.~ 
.  Whereas it is necessary to set a  time litrtit for takeo~er bids; 
Whereas to. be able to perform their functions satisfactorily, super-Visory authorities .must 
..  ·· . at  all times be able tcnequire the parties to the bid to provide information oh it; 
Whereas to avoid operationS which frustrate the bid it is necessary to litnit·the powers of 
.the -board of directors Of the offeree company to engage in operations of an exeeptional'· 
nature; 
. Whereas the board of  the offeree company should be required to rriake pub! ic a  doc~ment 
setting out its opinion on the bid arid the reasons on which it is .based;  ' 
.  •  .  '  '  _.1 
•  •  J  •  •  ••  • 
Whereas it is ne_cessary that Member States provide for rules covering the ca~es when the 
bid may be withdrawn or declared void once th(!  offer document has been made public, 
the right ofthe offeror to r'ev,ise its bid, the possibility of  competing bids for-the securhies 
of a company· which  are  necessarily  to_the ·advantage. of its  shareholders  and  the 
· disclosure of  the result of  the bid; 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE 
·. \.  -Article 1 
Scope 
The  coordination  measur~s  prescribed  by  this Directive  shall  ~pply  to  the  laws, 
regulations and  administrative provisions or other mechanisms  or arrangements of the 
Member States relating to takeover bios for'the securities of a company governed by the _ 
la:w ofa Member State, where such securities are admitted, wholly or partially, to trading 
on  a  market  in  one  or  more  Member  States  which  is  regulated  and  supervised  by 
authorities recognised by  public bodies, operates regularly and is  accessible, directly or-
indirectly, to the public. 
Article 2 
Definitions 
For the purposes of  this Directive_: 
"takeover bid" ("bid"). shall mean an offer made to the holders of  the securities of 
a company to acquire all or part of  such securities by payment in cash and/or in exchange -
for other securities. A bid may be either mandatory, if so provided by Member States as a 
means to protect minority shareholders, or voluntary; 
"offeree company" shall mean a company whose securities are· the subject of  a bid; 
"offeror"  shall  mean  any  natural  person  or legal  entity  in  public  or  private  law 
making a bid; 
"securities" shall mean transferable securities carrying voting rights in a company or 
conferring entitlement to obtain transferable securities carrying such rights; 
. "parties  to  the  bid"  shall  mean  the  offeror,  the · members  of  the  offeror's  . 
adminis!rative or management board, ·if the offeror is a company, the addressees of 
the bid and.the·members ofthe adm~nistrative or management board ofthe offeree 
company. 
Article 3 
Protection of  minority shareholders ' 
1.  Where a natural person. or  legal entity who as a result of  acquisition, holds securities 
which  added  to  any  existing  holdings  gi'-':e  him a  specified percentage. of :voting 
rights in· a company referred to  in Article  1,  conferring· on him the control of that 
company,  Member  States  should  ensure  that  rules  ·or  other  mechanisms  or 
arrangements  are  in  force  which  either  oblige  this  person  to  m-ake  a  bid  in 
accordance with article 10 or offer other appropriate and at least equivalent means in 
order to protect the minority shareholders of  that company. · 
·13 '  I· 
I· 
; 
! 
} . 
.. 
.1  • 
2.  The percentage of voting rights which confers control for the putposes of-paragraph 
1 and the way of its calculat!on shall be determined by the law of  the Member State 
where the supervisory authority i's  locate~. 
I;  ·Article 4' 
- .  .  .  . 
-St~pervisory  ~uthority 
•  j 
1.  .  Member States shall designate the  ~uthori.ty or  authorities~ which will  supervise all 
aspects  of the  bid:  The  authorities thus designated  may include·  associations  or 
pr;ivate  bodies.  Member States shall inform the Commission Of these designations . · 
.. and shall specify flll divisions of  functions that _may be. made.  . 
2.  The authority ~ompetent  for supervising the bid shall be that of  the Member State in 
which the offeree company h~  its registered office if the. securities of  the·co~pany 
· ar_e  admitted to trad.ing on a regulated market .in that Member State. Otherwise, the 
competent .authority shall be that of the Member· State on whose regulated market · 
the securities of  the company were  fi~st admitted to trading and  ~ie still traded; 
3.  Without prejudic'e 'to their duty: of  professional secrecy,' the .competent authorities of 
· the  Member States shall  cooperate,  in so  far  as  necessary· for the  performance of 
their duties· and for  this purpose  sh~Wsupply each other with any  ihtonriatiori that 
may be necessary.  . 
.  . 
4.  The supervisory authorities shall have all the powers necessary-for ,the exercise of 
theiLfunctions, wliich shall inClude· responsibility for ensuring that th~ parties to. a 
bid  comply  with the  rules  made  pursuant to  this Directive.  In  addition  Member. 
States can provide that their supervisory mithorities may, on the basis of a reasoned~·: 
decision,  grant  dero~ations  from  tl).e  rules.  drawn  up  in  accordance  with  this  ·. 
Directive provided that in granting such. derogations the supervisory autl).orities shall.· 
respect the principles mentioned in ·article 5.  .  ·.  "''  . 
\. 
5..  This Directive does not affect the power which courts. may have In a' Member-State 
to  decline to hear legal proceedings .and to. decide whether or not sU:ch proceedings 
affect  the  outcome  of the· bid provided  that an  injured  party:  ··enjoys _adequate 
remedies,  whether. through  ~m appeals  procedun::  operated  by  the  superv~sory 
authority  or  through  the  right to  take  proceedings before .the  courts .  to  claim 
compensation. 
· ArticleS 
.  General principl~s 
1.  For  the  purposes of the implementation  of-this~ Directive, -Member  States  shall· 
ensure. that the rules or  _other arrangements maqe  pursu~t  to this Directive respeCt· 
the following principles: 
(a)  all,holders of sec'uritles of an offeree co~pany who are in the same position 
are to be treated equally; .  . .  .  . .  .  .. 
(b)  the addressees of.  a· bid. are to have sufficient time and information to. enable . 
. them to reach a properly informed-decision on·the bid; ... 
.  .  -:·  . 
-:{4 
.. (  c} ·  the board of  an offeree company is to act in the interests of  the company as a 
whole;  · 
(d)  . false marketS must not be created in the securities of  the offeree company, of 
the offeror company, or of  any other company concerned by the bid;  · 
(  e}  offeree companies must not be hindered in the .  conduct of their affairs ·for 
longer tbaJi is reasonable by a bid for their securities. 
2.  In order to attain the  objectiv~ set out in paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure_ 
that  iules  are  in  force  which  satisfy  the  minimum  requirements  set. out in- the 
folloWing articles. 
Article 6 
Information 
1.  Member States shall ensure that rules are in force requiring that the decision to make 
a bid is made public and that the supervisory authority and the board of  the offeree 
company are informed of  the bid before this decision is made public. 
.  ' 
2.- Member States shall ensure that niles are· in (orce requiring _the  offeror to draw up · 
and  make  public m  good  time  an .  offer  document  containing  the  information 
necessary to enable the addressees of  the bid to reach a properly informed decision 
. on the bid. Before the offer document is made public, the offeror shall communicate 
it to the supervisory authority. ·  · 
3.  Those rules shall require that the document state at least : 
the terms of  the bid; 
the identity of  the offeror or, where the offeroris a company, the type, name 
and re~  office of  that company; 
the securities or class or classes of  securities for'which the bid is made; 
the consideration offered for each security or class of  s~urities and the basis . 
of  the valuation· used in determining it with particulars of  the way in which 
that considration is tC? be given ; 
the maximum and minimum percentages or quantities of  securities-which the 
offeror undertakes to acquire;. - · 
, details of  any existing holdings of  the offeror in the offeree company; 
all conditions to which the offer is subject; 
the offeror's intentions with  _regard to the fu~  business and undertakings of 
the offeree company, its employees and its management; •• 
-.... 
• 
1_ 
;,__ 
..  ~-
·-. 
/'-
. the ~eriod for· acceptance ofthe..bid,; ~ich  may-not be'less than folJ.r_we~ks 
•. or more than ten weeks £;-om the date ()~ whlchthe document is made public;' 
-' 
where . the  consideration  otl'ered  by  the  offeror  -inch!des -secUrities, > 
information about those. securiti~s. 
· .;Member States  shaln~nsure :that rules· are in force requiring that the parties .to a-bid 
,to .provide-the supe!visory' authority at  any ti.rrie  on· reqUest with, all information m  .  · 
their  possession .  conCerning  the  bid  Which  the  su~rYisory · authority · considers 
necessary for tlle discharge ofits fimctions.  - ·  ·  · 
Article 7 
I .. 
. Disclosure. 
i. .. M~niber States shall ensure that  rules are -in  fore~ which require a bidto be made 
public' iii such a way aS to avoid'the creation·offalse markets m  the securities of  the 
offeree company or of  the Cifferor:  .  ·  ·  .  · 
. - ~  '  .  '  .  ' 
'  '  /  '  .  - .  (,  •  .  J  •  ' 
2.  - Member States shall ·ensure that rules are  i~ force which provide. for the W.sclosure 
. qf  all iilformation or documents reqiilied in such a manner as to ensure that they are  ·. 
botll readily and promptly availabl~ to  th~ ~~essees  of  the_ bid..  '  - . ' 
- -Article 8 . 
'>. 
OI?iigations 9fthe  bo~rd  ofthe.offeree eo_mpany 
. Member States shall ensure that rUles ~e  in ,force requldng that:. 
··a)  ·, riterreceiving the  info~ation cof1ceming the bid arufuntn'the resUlt of  the- bid i~ 
''made public,  the board of the  offeree  comp~y  should abstain .from any-.action 
which  ~y  result in -the  frUstration  of the  offer, and notably  from  the iss¥ing 'of' 
shares which may tesu)t in a lasting impediment to the offeror to obtain control ovet< .. 
the o~eree company, unless it hasthe prior authorisati~n ofth~ general meeting of· 
tile shareholders given for ~s  purpose;  ·  ·  ·  · 
. ·b)  . the board' of  the offeree company shall draw up and make public a document setting . 
out its opinion on the bid together with the reasons on w~ch  it is based  .. 
"  ...  .  .  '  . 
;Article·9  .  .  •'  '· 
·-.  '•  .·  .. 
Rules applicable to the conduct_ of  bids . 
· In addition. Member States shall ensure that ~les are iri force. Which govern th~ ~6ndtict 
of  bids ~leaSt  for the foliowing matters:  .  ·  · · 
a)  •  withdrawal or nullity of  the bid  >  • 
~)  revjsion ofbids 
· . c)  -:  competing }:lids 
•  '  - .  I 
d) '  disclosure of  the result of bids 
.  ,- .  ( 
) Article 10 
Mandatory bid 
1.  Where  a ·Member State  provides  for  a  mandatory  bid  as  a  m~ans' to  protect the_ 
minority shareholders, this bid shall be launched to all shareholders for ali or for a 
substantial  p~rt of their q.oldings at a price which meets the objective of protecting 
their interests. 
2.  If the mandatory bid comprises only a part of the securities of the offeree company 
and· the shareholders offer to sell to  the, offeror more· shares than the partial offer 
covers, shareholders should be treated equally by means of a pro rata treatment of . 
their shareholdings. 
Article 11 
Transposition of the Directive 
1.  Member States shall ensure that the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
or  other  mechanisms  or arrangements- necessary  for  them  to  comply  with  this· 
· Directive are in force before 1 April 1998.  · 
·2.  Member States  shail  communicate  to  the  Commission the  proviSHJns  or  other 
. arrangements referred to in paragraph 1, making express reference to this D~rective. 
~  Article 12 
·Addresses of  the Directive 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
·-.  \  .. 
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